

Shifting development aid narratives: Whose interests are being served?

The adoption of Agenda 2030 launched a new era for development in terms of scale and ambition. For the first time, the international community agreed on universal goals and recognised that the fight against all forms of poverty and inequalities was at a crossroads between social, environmental and economic needs. The adoption of an agenda that aims to “leave no one behind” initiated a narrative shift with equity at the heart of the policy response.

As part of the roadmap to reach the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda¹ launched a new development finance agenda. The international community agreed that the financial gap of US \$2.5tn per year to achieve the SDGs by 2030 in developing countries will only be filled with the contribution of all sources of financing: external and domestic, public and private. As a result, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is increasingly framed as a catalyst to leverage other sources of investments, including from the private sector, in order to jump from “billions” to “trillions” and fill the funding and development gaps. In parallel, a number of reforms considerably changed development policies’ objectives and budgets, as well as global norms.

Four years into the implementation of Agenda 2030, what are the main changes in discourse and narrative that led to or justified how development aid would be restructured? Do those political declarations result in policy, normative and operational changes? Do the design and implementation of new development instruments reflect clear shifts in donor behaviour?

Through the lens of the EU and France’s development policies, we will try to understand whether the political, policy and operational changes are converging towards an evolution of development goals, strategies and actors and lead to the institutionalisation of a new way of doing aid. We used a mix of lexicometry (the measurement of the frequency with which words occur in text)² and qualitative analysis, looking at the evolution of language in French and European development policy documents and speeches (see list on page 2 and 3). This narrative analysis was then assessed against the changes in norms and accountability frameworks taking place at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as GHA’s own analysis of newly created development financing instruments (see page 10-13).

Narrative shift in development policy: reflecting a change in ODA objectives?

Poverty elimination or donors’ interests? A delicate balancing act

Although development cooperation has always been in part a tool of broader foreign, diplomatic and economic relations with recipient countries, in early 2000 it was mainly presented as an instrument of global solidarity with the aim of fighting poverty and protecting global public goods³.

In recent years, poverty elimination and the fight against inequalities remain the main goals of French and EU development policies, however those objectives are losing ground (see Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1 Objectives of the 2011, 2014 and 2019 French development policy documents

2011 Framework Document on Development	2019 Draft for the new Development Bill
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Promoting shared and sustainable growth• Fighting against poverty and inequalities• Preserving global public goods• Improving the rule of law	<i>“[The policy for global solidarity and development and the fight against global inequalities] contributes to the national interest of France, by producing long-term security, complementing the military and diplomatic action, in a global and integrated approach”⁵.</i>
2014 Development Act <i>“Promoting a sustainable development in developing countries, including its economic, social, environmental and cultural components”⁴.</i>	

This is the first time in France that a development policy document openly claims that the primary objective of ODA should be to contribute to the national interests of France and strengthen its position in the world. The 2011 Framework Document states that the French development policy should be at the service of both France’s and its closest partners’ interests. However the reference comes under the section focusing on the context within which the policy was developed, rather than its objectives.

Table 2 Objectives of the 2006, 2014/2015 and 2018 EU development funding instruments⁶

2006, 2014/2015 Regulations for the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument	2018 Proposal Regulations for the NDICI
Poverty eradication and sustainable development	<i>“To uphold and promote the Union’s values and interests worldwide in order to pursue the objectives and principles of its external action”</i>

The proposed regulation for the NDICI (2018) drops all reference to poverty eradication and sustainable development in its objectives, and only refers to “acting in accordance” with “the primary objective of Union’s development cooperation policy (...) [of] the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty” in the recital.

Simultaneously aligning aid with both recipient countries’ needs and donors’ interests is obvious in the changing political discourse.

LIST OF FRENCH AND EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES UNDER ANALYSIS



Framework policies for development

Document cadre : coopération au développement, une vision française (2011) – Framework document: Development cooperation, a French vision (2011)

Developed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this document synthesises the French strategy for cooperation, its geographic and sectorial priorities and the financial and human resources allocated by France to this policy.

Loi d'orientation et de programmation relative à la politique de développement et de solidarité internationale (2014) – Orientation and Programming Act on Development and International Solidarity Policy (2014)

Developed by the government and voted by the Parliament, this Act sets the objectives and strategic directions of French development policy.

Projet de loi d'orientation et de programmation relative au développement solidaire et à la lutte contre les inégalités mondiales (2019) – Draft Bill on Development and the Fight against Inequality (2019)

President Macron and the government committed to renewing the 2014 Development Act. A first draft of the Bill was shared with stakeholders in March 2019. At the time of publication of this report, the Bill has not been presented to Parliament for a vote yet.

CICID (Inter-ministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development) communiqués of 1999, 2000, February 2002, December 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2018.

Inter-ministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development meetings are chaired by the Prime Minister and gather Ministers whose portfolios are relevant to development and international cooperation. Meetings happen once every two or three years and reaffirm the objectives and strategic directions of the development policy as well as its modalities.



European Union development policies

The European Consensus on Development (2006)

The Consensus was developed to commit the European Council, the European Parliament and Commission, and the EU Member States to a common vision and framework for action for development cooperation.

Increasing the impact of EU development policy: an Agenda for Change (2011)

In 2011, the Commission set out a strategic EU approach to reducing poverty, including a more targeted and concentrated allocation of funding, which took the shape of the Agenda for Change.

The New European Consensus on Development 'Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future' (2017)

With the adoption of Agenda 2030 in 2015, the EU developed a new common vision for its development policy, which is aligned with the SDGs.

Frameworks for EU development funding instruments

Regulations of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (2006) and (2014)

The DCI covers cooperation with Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, the Middle-East and South Africa, but also with the whole of Africa with the newly established Pan-African Programme. It is also the legal basis for two thematic programmes aiming to address different global challenges: the Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme, which supports actions in environment and climate change, sustainable energy, human development, food and nutrition and migration and asylum; and the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities Programme. Under the 2014-2020 budget, the DCI represents €19.6bn.

Agreement for the 10th and 11th European Development Fund (EDF) (2006) and (2013) and Implementation Regulations of the 10th and 11th EDF (2006)⁷ and (2015)

Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, the EDF provides aid for 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partner countries and for the Overseas Countries and Territories of Member States. It aims to stimulate economic, social and human development, regional cooperation and integration. It is directly financed by EU Member States and therefore falls outside the EU budget and is implemented according to its own financial and implementation regulations. It amounts to €30.5bn for the period 2014-2020.

Proposal regulations for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) (2018) and its Annexes

As part of the next EU budget 2021-2027 and its Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU Commission published a proposal for the regulation establishing a new development instrument, the NDICI, with a proposed budget of €89.2bn. This new instrument would merge twelve previously existing external financing instruments into three components: a geographic, a thematic and a rapid-response component.

ACP-EU Partnership documents

Cotonou Agreement (2000) and its 2005, 2010 and 2014 revisions

The Cotonou agreement is the current ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, which frames the relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. It covers a total of 100 countries and will expire in February 2020.

The EU's negotiating directives for a new ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (2018)

The ACP's negotiating mandate for a post-Cotonou partnership agreement with the European Union (2018)

The expiration of the Cotonou Agreement is an opportunity to renew the EU's relationship with its ACP partners, taking into account the current global context and building on the Agenda 2030 and SDGs, the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the European Consensus on Development. Formal negotiations started in August 2018 and are guided by negotiating directives drafted by each Party.

“(…) Lastly, the third battle for international competitiveness: the battle of development. (...) Development is essential to support mainly our African partners. It's also a powerful lever for influence. It's also an element of global competitiveness. (...) Our development policy is a policy which very directly responds to the interests of France”.

Jean-Yves Le Drian

French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Ambassadors Conference, August 2019⁸

“Development policy aims for partnership based on mutual interests. When fragile states collapse or when terrorism expands in Africa, it is a direct threat to Europe. When trade flows increase and business environments improve, it is an opportunity for Europe as well”.

Neven Mimica

EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, introductory statement in front of the European Parliament, 2014⁹

“The combined assistance capacity of the EU and its Member States needs to be used coherently to promote our values and objectives (...) on the ground in partner countries”.

Jutta Urpilainen

Commissioner-Designate for International Partnerships, introductory statement in front of the EU Parliament, 2019¹⁰

Linking development with other policy objectives is not new. Civil society has long been calling for policy coherence for development (PCD), taking into account development policy objectives in other policies such as trade, taxation or research policies¹¹. Instead we are witnessing what civil society has called a “reverse PCD”¹², namely development policy being increasingly subordinated to other policy fields' objectives. New trends of mainstreaming migration, security and economic interests in development policy have emerged and worry civil society that aid is being increasingly diverted to fund new objectives, away from poverty elimination.

Mainstreaming EU's migration and security concerns into development policy

Further to the EU migration management crisis in 2015, the objective of preventing so-called “irregular migration” towards Europe has been progressively integrated and mainstreamed into EU and French development policies¹³,

at the risk of outweighing development objectives (see Figures 1 and 2).

“Whatever work programmes or legislative agendas say: The first priority today is and must be addressing the refugee crisis”.

Jean-Claude Juncker

President of the European Commission, 2015¹⁴.

Table 3 Words with which migration is associated in EU policies

2006 Regulations for the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument	2014/2015 Regulations for the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument	2018 NDICI Proposal Regulations
Capacity building Labour Asylum	Asylum Innovation Mobility Research	Irregular Root causes Forced Crisis Security

Figure 1: Number of occurrences of the word migration in French CICID Communiqués





Figure 2: Number of occurrences of the word “migration” in EU development policies



In addition to being substantially more featured in development policy documents, the language around migration has also shifted from being a positive contribution to development to a challenge to be dealt with development policy (see Table 3).

At EU level, policy documents until 2015 refer to the positive contribution of migration in development. The Agenda for Change (2011) even presents migration as a “global public good”, along food security and access to water, as opposed to a “global challenge” which include security and climate change for instance. The New Consensus for Development (2017) marks a first shift by stating that “migration has become an ever more pressing issue for both developing and developed countries”. The NDICI proposal regulations (2018) continues on this path, by mentioning the “migration/refugee crisis” five times, and by dropping all references to the positive potential of migration for development besides “the benefits of well-managed and regular migration”.

In France, the CICID communiqués contained references to the positive effects of migration until the CICID of 2018. The latter states that French development policy should “address the root causes of irregular migrations, assist regular migrations and provide support to refugees and internally displaced persons”¹⁵. Fighting the root causes of irregular migration appears for the first time as an objective of French development policy.

Similarly, EU’s and France’s security interests are also becoming more prominent in their respective development policies¹⁶ (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3 Number of occurrences of the word “security” in French CICID Communiqués





Figure 4 Number of occurrences of the word “security” in UE development policies



There is also a clear shift in how security is addressed in EU development policies, towards mainstreaming security objectives and actors in development. Previously referring

in the vast majority of cases to food, water or energy security, it now increasingly refers to notions of peace, conflict and defence¹⁷ (see Figures 5a, 5b and 5c).

Figure 5a Semantic field of security in EU development policies




Figure 5b Semantic field of security in EU development instruments





Figure 5c Semantic field of security in EU-ACP Partnership documents



In addition, the “security-development nexus” concept appears for the first time in the DCI regulations (2014) in the context of gender-based violence, child abduction, corruption and organised crimes, trafficking¹⁸, and border control. The New Consensus on Development (2017) then goes on to recognise the “nexus between sustainable development, humanitarian action, peace and security” and highlights the key role of security actors in development: “In the context of development cooperation, the EU and its Member States can also engage with security sector actors to build their capacity for ensuring sustainable development objectives, in particular the achievement of peaceful and inclusive societies.”

Although this trend is less visible within recent French development policy documents, the analysis of speeches shows that this shift is also part of the new French development agenda. During his first speech at the annual Conference of Ambassadors in August 2017¹⁹, President Macron introduced the concept of 3D “Defence, Development and Diplomacy”, crafting a new French foreign relation triptic based on development, diplomacy and defence objectives. This new approach is intended to support an integrated approach to restoring peace and security within regions of particular geopolitical interest, via the launch of new instruments such as the Alliance Sahel.

Both the security-development nexus and the 3D approach carry the risk of blurring the lines between security and development actors, which can lead to development partners being associated with security forces. Civil society has highlighted the risks of these approaches in several reports²⁰. It may lead to suspicion, distrust or resentment from beneficiary communities towards development actors, impeding the achievement of development objectives. Worse, the association with armed and security forces from different parties can pose security risks to development actors and the populations that they target.

An increased role for the private sector and expecting a return on investment

A new narrative is emerging from donors on both the need for an increased role of the private sector in development and for ODA to bring a return on investments.

From 2010 onwards, the occurrence of the word “private” in EU and French development policies has increasingly been linked to the central role of private finance in bridging the funding gap for development²¹. While the private sector was mentioned in previous documents, it was mainly seen as a stakeholder to engage with or support, with a specific emphasis on the local private sector²². At EU level, blending public and private resources or public-private partnerships appear for the first time in the second Cotonou Revision (2010).

Since then, this concept of private sector as a funder for development and the need to leverage private resources through ODA has been consistently used in all EU policy documents – in both the EU and ACP negotiating mandates for a new ACP-EU Partnership (2018); in the DCI regulation (2014) and in the NDICI proposal regulations

(2018); and in the Agenda for Change (2011) and the New Consensus for Development (2017). The New Consensus on Development (2017) presents the private sector as increasingly important along public authorities for achieving the SDGs: “the EU and its Member States recognise the key role of the private sector as an engine for long term sustainable development and the need to engage with it through structured dialogue and shared development objectives”. In a similar trend, the role of private investments for development is underlined in the French Framework Document for Development Cooperation (2011) and the 2016 CICID communiqué “reaffirms the importance of the contribution of companies and private sector actors in general in advanced economies as well as in developing countries to reach SDGs”²³.

The rationale to change aid into investments and development cooperation into partnerships has rallied support based on the principle that this change in semantics would convey a notion of equality and respect with regards to partner countries.

“‘Aid’ is not the good word. Our partners in the South don’t expect aid from France but a relationship, a commitment and an investment. The word ‘aid’ prevents this public policy from reaching a next step, because aid is something that is always external. Surely, we need to increase ODA”.

Rémy Rioux

Director-General of the French Development Agency, 2019²⁴.

“But I think we need to stop talking about aid and favour instead the notion of solidarity-based investment for development. It is a sign of respect and interest for our Southern partners. It is also a way to explain to the French people that our commitment has a positive return in terms of innovation, growth, security and attractiveness for our own country. Development policy forges concrete and positive links, that work both ways, between France and other countries”.

Rémy Rioux

Director-General of the French Development Agency, 2018²⁵.

Creating “win-win” situations which are mutually beneficial to all parties is getting more traction. In a context where populism is on the rise in the majority of donor countries, there is growing scepticism about spending taxpayer’s money outside the domestic sphere²⁶. In order to make the case for ODA, donors have changed the way they communicate about development, demonstrating how external investments can contribute to domestic objectives.

“Although a solidarity-based investment differs from a financial investment, it corresponds to a public policy, and a return is expected, which needs to be measured”.

Rémy Rioux

Director-General of the French Development Agency, 2019²⁷.

“Our support is not just about development aid, it’s about an investment in our partners, in return we gain stability, peace and prosperity and market opportunities for European companies”.

Johannes Hahn

Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, 2018²⁸.

Presented as an extension of donors’ diplomacy, defence and trade agendas, EU and France development policies’ objectives (poverty elimination and inequality reduction) and implementation strategies (aid effectiveness principles) are running the risk of becoming tools for migration-related, security and economic outputs.

Changes in ODA objectives: institutionalising new development norms

The narrative shift has had concrete policy implications, with serious consequences on the purpose of donors’ development policies. These changes have also led to normative shifts with implications on how donors measure and report on aid’s impact.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC)²⁹ definition of ODA has historically been based on a needs-driven rationale and aid effectiveness principles³⁰. However, the shift in narrative has blurred the lines between development objectives and those of other policies, with the integration of new stakeholders from the security, migration management and private sector

area, who bring their own set of rules and priorities. This has prompted discussions around the eligibility of their activities to be counted as ODA. How has this new set of practices impacted the way development is defined and accounted for?

In 2012, the OECD DAC launched a reform to modernise the statistical system of ODA reporting, in order to “improve its accuracy while reflecting the changes in the development cooperation sector”³¹. This led to a broadening of the definition of ODA to include activities and flows which previously were not eligible to be reported as ODA but are aligned with expenditures that are “deemed more palatable to domestic constituencies”³².

A push for ODA to be used for migration and security interests of donors

Starting in 2014 and accelerating in 2016 and 2017 alongside the perceived migration “crisis” in the EU, DAC members opened discussions on how to better reflect peace and security efforts and migration activities within their ODA budgets.

Peace and security expenditures: the DAC updated eligibility rules for peace and security expenditures in 2016 “to better recognise the marginal, but actual developmental role that military actors sometimes play, notably in conflict situations, while clearly delineating it from their main peace and security function”³³. From then on, money channelled through the military can, in specific instances, be counted as ODA³⁴. The DAC claimed that these changes were not expected to impact overall ODA volumes in a significant way³⁵. Civil society however, has called for caution around the interpretation of the new wording, as these changes “may result in resources being diverted away from activities with a greater development and poverty reduction focus in favour of those that align to national security and political priorities”³⁶.

Migration purpose code: in March 2017, further to an EU proposal, discussions started for the first time on a new reporting code³⁷ that would capture ODA-eligible migration activities. In June 2018, the new purpose code that would ensure the “facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility” was adopted by the DAC. Although the DAC maintains that ODA should be used exclusively for development objectives³⁸, civil society expressed concerns around the risks of reporting activities that serve donors’ migration objectives at the expense of the needs of partner countries and populations. Civil society also points to the risk that this new code may lead to the formalisation of the conditioning of ODA based on the level of collaboration of partner countries in migration management and border control³⁹.

Beyond ODA: catalysing additional resources for development

Because of the “billions to trillions” narrative, a larger share of development finance is now expected to come from other sources than traditional ODA: development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the private sector more broadly, but also from South-South cooperation, emerging donors, and other providers.

Private sector instruments: In 2016, DAC members agreed that ODA needed to better reflect donor efforts in leveraging the use of private sector instruments (PSIs) including grants, reimbursable grants, debt instruments, guarantees and equity⁴⁰. After failing to agree on a set of comprehensive rules to report such flows, DAC members agreed on provisional reporting rules for their 2018 PSI flows, to be reviewed in 2021 unless permanent rules are agreed before. As they stand, the rules state that any capital contributions to DFIs or other PSI vehicles made in 2018 may be included in ODA at their face value. In addition, the amount of ODA reported by these DFIs may be based on an estimated share of ODA, rather than the sum of each specific eligible activity⁴¹. Civil society has voiced concerns around this approach⁴², which carries the risk of inflating ODA through the inclusion of activities that do not meet its criteria. It also risks undermining the principle of concessionality of ODA – to be counted as ODA, a flow needs to have concessional financial terms (grants or loans with low interest rates). Civil society therefore recommends counting as ODA only the concessional element of PSIs (called their grant equivalent) rather than their face value⁴³. Civil society has also been vocal about the lack of transparency and accountability regarding the financial and development additionality of these flows. If these are not assessed and publicly disclosed, the objectives of ODA may become diluted and diverted away from reaching the ones left behind⁴⁴. Yet another risk in using ODA to subsidise private sector engagement in development is the possible increase of informal “tied aid” – aid that is granted to support donors’ domestic private sector interests.

Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD):

In 2014, just ahead of the adoption of Agenda 2030, the DAC agreed to develop a new statistical measure that would recognise the efforts being made beyond ODA for SDG financing. This includes the catalytic effect of ODA, the use of blended finance packages and the use of risk mitigation instruments in development cooperation. The methodology for TOSSD was developed starting in 2017 to include all officially-supported resource flows – public and private – which promote sustainable development in developing countries, and address global challenges at regional or global levels⁴⁵. While the methodology and reporting guidelines are still being finalised, civil society has already expressed several concerns, including on the risk of undermining public concessional commitments at the expense of all other flows. The development impacts and quality of the activities reported under TOSSD, the transparency and granularity of the information available and the lack of willingness to disaggregate data to measure impact on marginalised groups are all being questioned⁴⁶.

Although there is no public information on the French and EU positions within these two debates, France has pushed for the issues of PSIs and TOSSD during its G7 presidency in 2019. The G7 declaration on sustainable development financing⁴⁷ mentions the “need to increase the catalytic effect of ODA to mobilise additional financial resources, including from the private sector and foundations, and to increase their impact” and the “need for accelerating the support of the private sector to the SDGs”⁴⁸. It also welcomes positively the work done on TOSSD.

With a new set of rules, donors have institutionalised a common approach that allows them to report a greater share of migration-related spending, the use of private sector instruments, the counting of loans to private sector as net ODA and reporting financing flows beyond public concessional financial efforts.

This reform agenda is occurring while donors are failing to collectively reach the target of 0.7% GNI allocated to ODA. ODA levels are stagnating when not dropping for countries and sectors that need it most. ODA to Least Developed Countries has dropped below 30% of total ODA in 2017, after reaching a peak of 32.5% of total ODA in 2010⁴⁹. ODA to health and education are respectively stagnating and falling.

The risk of politicisation of aid has also been raised outside civil society. In December 2018, three former DAC chairs published an open letter calling the reform a “politically-motivated discussion guided by Finance Ministries” with the aim to reduce pressures to increase aid expenditure that was at risk of “placing the clarity, integrity and credibility of ODA statistics at risk”⁵⁰.

Narrative and normative shifts: opening the way for operational shifts.

In order to contribute to the on-going policy dialogue on global development, GHA analysed new instruments developed by bilateral, regional and multilateral donors and their compliance with internationally recognised principles of aid effectiveness. Instruments under scrutiny are: the Alliance Sahel, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the EU External Investment Plan (EIP), the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) and the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). We developed and applied an analytical framework focusing on governance set-ups, agenda-setting processes, stakeholder engagement, types of funding mechanisms, implementation channels, transparency and accountability. Our analysis looked at decision-making and power dynamics both at the global and national levels to understand the design and implementation of these instruments.

GHA’s analysis of some of the newly created instruments shows that tying aid to migration is a flawed approach, and that the leverage effects of blended finance is so far limited. The emergence of these trends seem to be mainly a response to donors’ interests, driven by their political agendas, rather than by evidence-based decision-making

for pro-poor development impact. This brief is part of a series of policy briefs which aims at analysing political trends in development finance and informing the decision making process at the French, EU and global levels, available at <http://www.ghadvocates.eu/en/development-finance-trends/>

- Added value of new development instruments: Scaling up before impact?
- Blending private interests with taxpayer's money: Towards a development-investment nexus?
- Aiding and Abetting: The diversion of European development budgets to migration and security and global levels.

Political trends in development finance under scrutiny

- **Securitisation of aid:** the use of aid in the pursuit of donors' own political and security objectives
- **Privatisation of aid:** use of public money to unlock additional private resources by de-risking private sector investments
- **Financialisation of aid:** creating a market for pandemics to overcome the lack of financial capacity of countries to respond to public health emergencies
- **Catalytic finance:** use of public money to leverage additional sources of financing to close the financing gap for SDGs.



Name: Alliance Sahel
Date of birth: July 2017
Place of birth: Paris, Berlin and Brussels
Expiry date: 2022

The Alliance Sahel is a partnership between donor countries and G5 Sahel countries which aims at providing an appropriate and effective response to the challenges facing the Sahel through:

- Strengthened coordination on six priority sectors (education and youth employment; rural development, agriculture and food security; energy and climate; governance; decentralisation and basic services; internal security)
- Mutual accountability between development partners and Sahel countries based on shared results: priority sectors will be subject to mutual commitments on concrete 1-year, 3-year and 5-year objectives
- Innovative implementation modalities, including mechanisms to increase private sector investments, that allow to operate in regions where the state is no longer present, reduce implementation periods and improve absorption capacity of Sahel countries
- Increased support to security forces and particular attention to the most vulnerable and fragile zones

Partners: G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) and development partners (African Development Bank, Denmark, European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, the United Nations Development Programme, United Kingdom, World Bank). All G7 countries are either members or observers.

Objectives:

- Encourage a more efficient coordination of ODA in the Sahel region
- Improve the support of development partners in the region to better contribute to its stabilisation and to the elimination of poverty by developing rural zones, creating jobs for the youth, improving energy infrastructures and strengthening governance

How much money? €11bn as of January 2019-mainly existing and ongoing projects that receive the label Alliance Sahel if they fit under its objectives and principles

Development trend: Securitisation of aid: the use of aid in the pursuit of donors' own political and security objectives in the Sahel.

Source: *Founding Act of the Sahel Alliance, Franco-German Council of Ministers, 13 July 2017*

Website available at: <https://bit.ly/34E06mR>



Name: Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF)
Date of birth: July 2015
Place of birth: Washington D.C.
Expiry date / renewal date: 2023

The GFF is a partnership that brings together key stakeholders in order to accelerate progress on health and nutrition. It currently supports 36 countries and aims to expand to 50 countries with the highest maternal and child mortality burdens by 2023. The GFF is a financing facility, it is not a new fund. Its model aims to use modest amounts of grant resources from the GFF Trust Fund catalytically, by leveraging domestic resources, IDA and IBRD financing, donor financing and resources from the private sector in order to bring existing programmes to scale.

Objectives:

- Support low- and lower-middle-income countries to accelerate progress on reproductive, maternal, new-born, child and adolescent health and nutrition (RMNCAH)
- Strengthen financing and health systems for universal health coverage

How much money? US \$1.8bn in the GFF Trust Fund

Development trend: Catalytic finance: use of public money to leverage additional sources of financing to close the financing gap for RMNCAH

Source: World Bank, September 2019. Global Financing Facility Brochure
 Website available at: <https://bit.ly/34yXwhU>



Name: Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF)
Date of birth: July 2017
Place of birth: Washington D.C.
Renewal date: July 2020

The PEF is an innovative, insurance-based financing mechanism mixing public and private money, developed by the World Bank in consultation with the World Health Organisation, development partners and the private sector. Its purpose is to provide surge financing to the world's poorest countries in order to respond to pandemic outbreaks. It delivers financing through two windows, which can be activated when large-scale outbreaks are deemed likely to cause pandemics:

- the insurance window (pandemic influenza, coronaviruses, filoviruses, Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever, Lassa fever)
- the cash window (all diseases covered under the insurance window and other infectious diseases caused by pathogens that are not currently endemically transmitted within human population, including new and unknown pathogens)

Objectives:

- Make surge financing available to key stakeholders (governments, multilateral agencies and civil society organisations) to respond to an outbreak with pandemic potential and minimise its health and economic consequences
- Help catalyse the creation of a global market for pandemic insurance instruments by drawing on resources from insurance, bonds and / or other private sector financial instruments
- Help encourage and strengthen ongoing efforts toward better country preparedness, which contribute to build strong and resilient health systems and accelerate the achievement of universal health coverage

How much money? Insurance window of US \$425mn; cash window of US \$64mn

Development trend: Financialisation of aid: creating a market for pandemics to overcome the lack of financial capacity of countries to respond to public health emergencies

Source: World Bank, February 2019. Operational Brief for Eligible Countries
 Website available at: <https://bit.ly/2K7GnnN>



Name: External Investment Plan – European Fund for Sustainable Development

Date of birth: September 2017

Place of birth: Brussels

Renewal date: 2021

The EIP sets out an integrated framework to improve investments in Africa and the European neighbourhood to promote decent job creation, inclusive and sustainable development, and tackle some of the root causes of migration. The EU aims to go beyond 'traditional' development aid based on grants and instead use innovative financial products, such as risk-sharing guarantees and the blending of grants and loans to ensure that investments have a bigger development impact. It supports a broad range of sectors such as energy and climate, water, transport, information and communication technologies, social infrastructure, health and investment in human capital. It aims to focus on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and private-sector development while promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women and young people. It is structured around three pillars of intervention:

- The European Fund for Sustainable Development, comprised of two regional investment platforms (Africa and Neighbourhood) and a new EFSD Guarantee
- Technical assistance to develop bankable projects and help improve the investment climate and business environment in partner countries

- Investment climate and business environment improved through structured dialogue with the private sector and enhanced policy dialogue

Objectives:

- Contribute to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) while tackling some of the root causes of migration
- Mobilise and leverage sustainable public and private investments to improve economic and social development with a particular focus on decent job creation

How much money? €4.5 bn expected to leverage more than €44bn of public and private investments

Development trend: Privatisation of aid: use of public money to unlock additional private resources by de-risking private sector investments

*Source: European Commission, November 2017. Your guide to the External Investment Plan
Website available at: <https://bit.ly/34BbAYg>*



Name: EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)

Date of birth: November 2015

Place of birth: Brussels

Expiry date: December 2020

The EUTF was launched by European and African partners at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015 to deliver an integrated and coordinated response to the diverse causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement. The EUTF for Africa supports vulnerable and marginalised population groups, migrants and forcibly displaced people, their origin and host communities, victims of trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling and potential migrants. Activities are implemented in 26 partner countries across three regions of Africa – the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa – and focus on economic development, strengthening resilience, improving migration governance and management and supporting improvements in overall governance.

Objectives:

- Address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration
- Contribute to better migration management
- Provide new impetus for EU cooperation on migration by creating a platform to reinforce political engagement and dialogue with partner countries in Africa, pooling together EU and other donors' resources, and enlarging the EU evidence base to better understand the drivers and dynamics of migration
- Build a comprehensive approach to support all aspects of stability, security and resilience, aiming at addressing the conditions that could be conducive to violence and destabilisation, and supporting governments in their efforts to improve security.

How much money? €4.6bn

Development trend: Securitisation of aid: the use of aid in the pursuit of EU's own migration and security objectives

Source: EUTF Website

ENDNOTES

- The Addis Ababa Action Agenda came out of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development which took place in July 2015, with the aim to "establish a holistic and forward-looking framework to commit to concrete actions to deliver on the promise" of the post-2015 development agenda, including SDGs. Declaration available at: <https://bit.ly/32h9o6w>
- GHA used the software "TXM", which is able to analyse large corpus of text through automatic processing. GHA pulled out the number of occurrences for specific words of interest (e.g. poverty, migration, security, private sector, etc.), and the co-occurrences for these words (the words with which they are most associated in the text)
- ODI, March 2019. Understanding donor motivations: developing the Principled Aid Index. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2CiXAGr>; ODI, October 2017. Global development trends and challenges: Horizon 2025 revisited. Available at: <https://bit.ly/36HaVGu>; IDDRi, April 2017. What rationales for international development aid? Main donors' objectives and implications for France. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2CCm515>.
- Original verbatim: « promouvoir un développement durable dans les pays en développement, dans ses composantes économiques, sociales, environnementales et culturelles. »
- Original verbatim: « Cette politique contribue à l'intérêt national de la France, en produisant de la sécurité de long terme, en complément de l'action militaire et diplomatique, dans une approche globale intégrée. »
- As included in the general provisions of the text – i.e. the binding articles
- GHA analysed the Proposal for the 2006 Implementation Regulations for the 10th EDF, as the final regulation document was not available online.
- Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, during his closing speech at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris on August 29th, 2019. Original verbatim: « (...) Enfin, troisième bataille de la compétition internationale : la bataille du développement. (...) Le développement est essentiel pour accompagner principalement nos partenaires africains. C'est aussi un puissant levier d'influence. C'est aussi un élément de la compétition mondiale. (...) Notre politique de développement est une politique qui répond très directement aux intérêts de la France. » Available at: <https://bit.ly/2JZtYSz>
- Neven Mimica, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, during his introductory statement in front of the European Parliament in 2014. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Noxw2Z>.
- Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner-Designate for International Partnerships during her introductory statement in front of the EU Parliament in October 2019. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2WY17DC>.
- These policies include trade, environment, climate change, security, food security, agriculture, fisheries, social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, migration, research and innovation, information society, transport, energy, finance, illicit financial flows and tax avoidance.
- CONCORD, 2018. CONCORD's responses to the Public Consultation on the Evaluation of the EU's Policy Coherence for Development. Available at: <https://bit.ly/36McjHZ>
- GHA analysed the number of occurrences for words with the root -migr- (e.g. migration, migrants, immigration, etc.)
- Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, during the 2015 State of the Union Speech, in September 2015. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2ChT2zY>
- Original verbatim: « Elle doit permettre de (...) travailler sur les causes profondes des migrations irrégulières, d'accompagner les migrations régulières et de venir en appui des réfugiés et déplacés internes. »
- GHA analysed the number of occurrences for words with the root -secur- (e.g. security, insecurity, etc.)
- GHA analysed the co-occurrences around the word 'security'. For 'food, water and energy', words like nutrition and agriculture were added to the analysis. For 'conflict and peace', words like armed forces, nexus, migration, military, stabilisation and crime were added to the analysis. Words that did not relate to either (e.g. achieved, goal, price, etc.) are not included in the graphs.
- Including production, consumption and trafficking of drugs, and other forms of trafficking
- Emmanuel Macron, President of France, during his speech at the Conference of the Ambassadors in August 2017. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2NoylIT>.
- CONCORD, 2018. Aidwatch 2018: Security aid, fostering development or serving European donors' national interests? Available at: <https://bit.ly/36LGT56>; ACF, Oxfam and Save the Children, 2018. Sahel: priorité à la résilience et au développement. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2Co6UIW>; Oxfam, 2011. Who aid is it anyway? Politicizing aid in conflicts and crises. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2JYIE5A>
- Qualitative analysis of EU policies of occurrences of the expressions "private sector", "private funding", "private investments"
- Qualitative analysis of EU policies of occurrences of the expressions "private sector", "private funding", "private investments"
- Original verbatim: « Le gouvernement réaffirme l'importance de la contribution des entreprises et de l'ensemble des acteurs du secteur privé, dans les économies avancées comme dans les pays en développement, pour atteindre les ODD. »
- Rémy Rioux, Director-General of the French Development Agency (AFD), during a hearing in front of the Finance Committee of the Senate on February 13th, 2019. Original verbatim: « Pour autant, 'aide' n'est pas un bon mot. Nos partenaires du Sud n'attendent pas de la France de l'aide mais du lien, de l'engagement, de l'investissement. Le mot 'aide' empêche cette politique publique de passer à l'étape suivante, parce que l'aide, c'est quelque chose qui vous est toujours un peu extérieur. Il faut certes augmenter
- APD. » Available at: <https://bit.ly/2NmZSKX>.
- Interview of Rémy Rioux, Director-General of the French Development Agency (AFD) in Le Monde Africa, September 18th, 2018. Original verbatim: « Mais je crois qu'il faut cesser de parler d'aide et préférer en effet la notion d'investissement solidaire de développement. C'est une marque de respect et d'intérêt pour nos partenaires du Sud. C'est aussi une façon d'expliquer aux Français que notre engagement a un retour positif, en termes d'innovation, de croissance, de sécurité et d'attractivité pour notre propre pays. La politique de développement tisse des liens concrets, positifs, dans les deux sens, entre la France et les autres pays. » Available at: <https://bit.ly/2NmQ3wy>.
- ODI, March 2019. The Principled Aid Index, page 2. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2NodVQd>.
- Rémy Rioux, Director-General of the French Development Agency (AFD), during a hearing in front of the Finance Committee of the Senate on February 13th, 2019. Original verbatim: « Si un investissement solidaire diffère d'un investissement financier, il correspond à une politique publique, et on en attend donc un retour, qu'il faut apprendre à mesurer. » Available at: <https://bit.ly/2NmZSKX>.
- European Commission, June 2019. EIP/EFSD Operational Report 2018. Foreword by Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, page 3. Available at: <https://bit.ly/34EduXX>
- The OECD's Development Assistance Committee is a forum of the 30 largest providers of aid created in 1960, which sets international principles and standards for development cooperation and monitors how donors deliver on their commitments. It defines ODA eligibility rules and provides annual ODA data from donor reporting.
- Niels Keijzer and Erik Lundsgaarde, 2017. When unintended effects become intended: implications of 'mutual benefit' discourses for development studies and evaluation practices, page 6. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2KcR1cX>.
- OECD, Modernisation of the DAC statistical system. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2Q167pg>
- ODI, 2017. Global development trends and challenges: Horizon 2025 revisited, page 17. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2rj9Sw5>
- OECD, Modernisation of the DAC statistical system. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2Q167pg>
- The changes include (1) Limited engagement with partner country military in the form of training of military employees can be permitted under civilian oversight, with a clear development purpose for the benefit of civilians and to help address abuses, prevent violence against women, improve humanitarian response and promote good governance. (2) Using the military as a last resort to deliver development services and humanitarian aid. (3) ODA-eligible activities for preventing violent extremism (education and research, community-based efforts, rule of law, capacity of judicial systems, etc.)
- OECD DAC Secretariat, March 2016. The scope and nature of 2016 HLM decisions regarding the ODA-eligibility of peace and security-related expenditures, page 3. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2JXW2WG>.
- Development Initiatives, February 2016. New aid rules allow for the inclusion of a wider set of peace and security activities. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2oTzMF5>
- The OECD has various code lists (donor, agency, recipient, channel, type of flow, etc.) which are used by donors to report on their aid flows to the DAC databases. Purpose codes are used to identify the sector of destination of a contribution;
- OECD DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, May 2018. Proposed new purpose code for "Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility", page 4. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2ChHdZ>.
- CONCORD, 2018. Aidwatch 2018: Aid and migration, the externalisation of Europe's responsibilities. Available at: <https://bit.ly/33v5ico>.
- Private sector instruments and what the OECD means by engagement with the private sector are defined by the DAC in this document: OECD DAC, 2016. Private Sector Peer Learning: Peer Inventory 1, Private Sector Engagement Terminology and Typology. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2WQKfOU>.
- OECD, 2019, Modernisation of the DAC statistical system. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2Q167pg>
- Eurodad, October 2018. Civil society organisations' position on Private Sector Instruments. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2PUMfY>.
- Eurodad, October 2018. Civil society organisations' position on Private Sector Instruments, page 2. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2PUMfY>.
- Eurodad, October 2018. Civil society organisations' position on Private Sector Instruments, page 1. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2PUMfY>.
- OECD, TOSSD, 2019: Key documents, definition, roadmap and workplan. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2PVIkr8>.
- DAC CSO Reference Group, September 2019. Messages for the F2F Consultation with the Global Task Force. Available at: <https://bit.ly/34NgjWX>.
- Declaration available at: <https://bit.ly/2yqgWVU>.
- Original verbatim: « la nécessité d'augmenter l'effet catalytique de l'APD pour mobiliser des ressources financières supplémentaires, dont celles provenant du secteur privé et des fondations, et augmenter leur impact » and « il est nécessaire d'accélérer le soutien apporté par le secteur privé aux ODD ».
- OECD DAC, 2019, Development Co-Operations Profiles. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3585fUr>
- J. Brian Atwood, Richard Manning and Hedwig Riegler, Brookings, December 2018. Don't undermine the basic architecture of OECD/DAC statistics: a letter of warning. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3585fUr>



Global Health Advocates France (GHA) is a global health advocacy organisation dedicated to fighting diseases stemming from poverty and inequality. GHA's mission is to advocate for policy change at the highest political level and mobilise resources to tackle major health threats, build sustainable health systems and enhance health equity. GHA has offices in Paris and Brussels.

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